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Abstract
A product has a social network dimension when its use involves interaction between
people. We analyse monopoly pricing in a market where consumers are characterised by
their social relations. Consumers get utility from interacting with other people with whom
they have a social relation. The monopolist sells a device that enables efficient interaction.
This paper introduces two novel features to social relations literature. One, we make
players' payoffs endogenous by setting a monopoly pricing problem on top of a network
coordination game. Two, we abandon the perfect information assumption by limiting
players' capacity to observe prevailing information. Asymmetric information eliminates
much of the complexity inherent in the perfect information variant: the role of consumer
identity is eliminated, but the role of network structure is maintained. We analyse the roles
of network topology and size on the monopoly price and surplus generated in the network.
In markets where social relations are important, the implicit assumption on total
connectedness of conventional network externalities models exaggerates the value of the
network. The topological effect works against, and dominates the size effect. Therefore,
the monopolist incorporates network topology in its price. Under asymmetric information,
the monopoly prefers symmetric networks, but the social optimum is an asymmetric
network. If the firm is allowed to price discriminate, its profits increase to the same level
that it obtains in symmetric networks. Monopoly rents and consumer surplus decrease as
consumer heterogeneity is increased. This does not necessarily happen under perfect
information; it depends on the network topology.
JEL Classification: D42, D82, L14.
Keywords: Social relations, networks, coordination, monopoly.
Pekka Sääskilahti
Helsinki School of Economics
Department of Economics
Helsinki School of Economics
P.O. Box 1210
FI-00101 Helsinki
FINLAND
e-mail: saaskilahti@yahoo.com
* I thank Yann Bramoullé, Pekka Ilmakunnas, Olli Kauppi, Pauli Murto, Jean-Charles Rochet,
Steinar Vagstad, and Juuso Välimäki for helpful comments. I also thank Université de Toulouse 1
for the hospitality while I was staying there 2003-04, and European Commission and ENTER
network, FDPE, and Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation for financial support.
1 Introduction
In the theory of network economics, network e¤ects have been predominantly synthesised in posi-
tive externalities: agents utility increases as an additional member joins the network. What this
approach has overlooked are the e¤ects of network topology. These e¤ects have only recently been
incorporated in the research. This paper shows how industry performance depends on both the
size e¤ects (positive externalities) and the topological e¤ects.
People have a varying number of social relations. Some people maintain a small number of
close relations, whereas some people have a large number of acquaintances that are more shal-
low. In some collectivist cultures, family constitutes the main social reference group, whereas in
more individualist cultures the most important social relations can be friends outside the family.
Diversity in peoples social relations extends to group level behaviour directly. Cooperation in
Japanese keiretsu-groups exceeds that of pure supplier-buyer relationships. In high tech indus-
tries, rms have formed R&D alliances where varying levels of interest often include government
participation. Conventional economic models of networks have abstracted this kind of diversity
away. The conventional externalities model building on the seminal work by Farrell & Saloner
(1985, 1986), Katz & Shapiro (1985), David (1985) and Arthur (1989) assumes a functional form
for network e¤ects: a network members utility increases directly, the more people join the net-
work1 . This approach involves an implicit assumption that takes the underlying relations network
as a completely connected graph. What it means is that any kind of heterogeneity in terms of
social relations is absent. Network members are symmetric in terms of connectedness, therefore,
in markets where (asymmetric) social relations are important, conventional models fall short and
need to be corrected. In this paper, we examine how two static properties of social networks, size
1 Network externalities appear most commonly as a linear function of the number of network members. Consider
the example by Mason & Valletti (2001): Assume that a link between two network members corresponds to utility
equal to 1: When a member indexed as n joins the network with n 1 existing members, the total utility generated
in the network increases by amount 2 (n  1). The total utility equals n (n  1) in the network of n members.
When n is large, we have n (n  1)  n2: This corresponds to the famous Metcalfes Law, which states that the
value of the network equals the square of the number of network members.
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and topology, a¤ect monopolys pricing strategy and total surplus generated in the network.
Recent work on economics of social relations has moved beyond the traditional functional
forms of network externalities. Modern models consider richer forms of underlying networks. The
emphasis is on the topology of the underlying social network. In these models it is important to
know who is connected to whom. In a social network, there can be well-connected members and
members with very little relations. Such heterogeneity leads to asymmetric behaviour.
Social relations literature has thus far focused on models where the interest is in outcomes of
games that are structured in a form of network. The underlying network is (usually) xed so that
agents inherit their social characteristics from outside the model. On top of the network, agents
play a game of perfect information. The interesting question is how network members can benet
from their network position? In this paper, we study the role of social relations in markets for
network goods such as personal telecommunications equipment, e-mail clients, and online game
consoles. Our model di¤ers from the previous work in two aspects. First, we introduce a monopoly
pricing decision which makes playerspayo¤s endogenous. The question we are interested in is how
an external player (the rm) can take advantage of the network structure. Second, we introduce
imperfect information.
Communications networks, rural village economies, and job markets are the most obvious
examples of markets where social relations have a non-trivial role. Goldstein et al. (2002) and
Udry & Conley (2004) study di¤erent overlapping social networks including mutual insurance and
information sharing in Ghanaian villages. Gaduh (2002) surveys work on social learning networks
in village economies. There is a rapidly growing amount of literature on the role of social networks
in labour economics. Applications include Calvó-Armengol & Jackson (2004) and Bramoullé &
Saint-Paul (2004) who analyse the interdependence between social relations and unemployment.
Bentolila et al. (2004) and Labini (2004) compare wage di¤erentials between employees who nd
their jobs through either formal or informal channels (social relations). Ioannides & Loury (2004)
is a survey of the literature on social relations in labour markets. Bramoullé & Kranton (2004)
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study public good provision, particularly innovation and experimentation, in di¤erent network
settings. Kranton & Minehart (2001) discuss buyer-seller networks, and how buyers (sellers) can
hedge against too high dependency on a single subcontractor (client) by forming links with other
subcontractors (clients). Goyal et al. (2003) present a model of R&D where di¤erent levels of
R&D collaboration are mapped as networks. Glaeser et al. (1996) and Ballester et al. (2004)
study how crime rates are a¤ected by social relations. Chwe (2000) analyses how the di¤usion
speed of political action depends on the social network. Glaeser & Scheinkman (2003) discuss
various models of non-market social interactions.
Our model is also related to a more dynamic class of games, namely local interaction models (see
Ellison 1993, Young 1998 ch.6, Lee & Valentinyi 2000 or Morris 2000). Local interaction models
analyse how a particular equilibrium play becomes adopted in the long run. Key features of local
interaction games are xed network structures, imperfect rationality of agents, and exogenous
payo¤s.
There exists two classes of social relations models. One class treats network structures ex-
ogenous to the model, and the other studies endogenous network formation. Jackson (2003) is
a survey on endogenous (undirected) network formation models. Endogenous network formation
models tend to be more abstract and less applicable to problems associated with personal social
relations. When link formation is endogenous, it must comprise all relevant aspects. For example,
a decision to form a personal link can be based on family ties, friendships, occupational and eco-
nomic issues, always encompassing a vast number of personal characteristics. In most cases, the
economic dimension of a personal link is di¢ cult to isolate. In contrast, if the network of social
relations is exogenous, we can focus on a specic economic problem, such as whether to buy or
not a mobile phone. The applied xed network structure can reect personal relations which give
utility that is hard to measure against utility from consumption of mobile services. Moreover,
social relations in many cases exist prior to the decision making. In the mobile phone example:
when we think about buying the phone, we think about with whom of our acquaintances we can
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use it; not how many new contacts we make when using it. Hence, there is a reason for separating
social aspects from economic decision making and taking them as exogenous parameters. But,
separation of social relations from economic decisions does not mean that they are irrelevant.
In models where the network does not characterise personal relations, such as rm-level R&D
networks, endogenous link formation ts well. All link formation decisions involve payo¤ of the
same kind. As predicted Goyal et al. (2003) and Kranton & Minehart (2001), who analyse rms
as decision makers, consider endogenous network formation. The payo¤s from link formation for
rms are better comparable and comprehensive.
In this paper, we depart from the implicit assumption of symmetric complete graphs of conven-
tional network externalities models. Players are characterised by their exogenous personal social
networks. Each person is interested only in interaction with a subset of the population, called his
neighbourhood. The idea is that the social relations are determined outside of the model. A social
link between consumers could mean for example that they are friends, relatives, or colleagues that
tend to do things together, thus have a need to interact. We analyse a monopoly market for pure
coordination goods. The product does not have any standalone value, but all utility is generated
in interaction between people. Consumers need to coordinate their purchases as the only way to
benet from the product is through interaction (e¢ cient interaction is possible only if all parties
have the device). They must decide whether to switch to the new good or to stay using the legacy
system. The vendor must decide on an (introductory) price. What is important is that consumers
cannot tailor their actions vis-à-vis each neighbour. They need to take a single action that applies
to every neighbour. This way consumers must consider the overall network structure, rather than
each particular link separately.
We consider two informational regimes. One, where all information is perfect to all players.
In the other case, buyersvaluations of the good are private information. We give general char-
acterisations of both cases. Then we apply the general results to three basic network structures:
complete graph, circle, and star. The complete graph and the circle are symmetric networks,
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whereas the star is asymmetric.
We show how the topology of the social network a¤ects the rms pricing strategy and total
surplus generated in the network. Under perfect information, the monopolist chooses to cover the
whole market even if it is unable to price discriminate in some network structures. In identical
networks, except in terms of who is connected to whom, the rm may choose to limit supply.
It is shown how some agents have preferential roles through their connections. These critical
agents are able to capture higher surplus than other agents. Interestingly, critical positions exist
in asymmetric and symmetric networks under perfect information. In symmetric networks critical
positions are due to consumer heterogeneity. Agents who have links with high types are critical,
as opposed to the high types themselves.
When information is reduced to asymmetric, critical agents lose their market power in sym-
metric networks. On the other hand, in asymmetric networks, the topologically central agents
now always capture higher utility. This is not true necessarily with perfect information.
There are three main ndings in the paper. One, network topology matters. Two, the implicit
complete graph assumption of the conventional network externality model risks seriously overesti-
mating the value of network e¤ects. Three, with private information, asymmetric networks yield
lower prots, but higher total surplus, than symmetric networks of a given link value. However,
the rm can match the prots generated in symmetric networks by price discriminating according
to the network position.
The paper is organised in the following way. In section 2, we formulate the utility function
and formalise the social network. In section 3 we study the perfect information case. In section
4 we analyse the asymmetric information case. Section 5 presents some interesting extensions to
the basic model. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2 Network structure and actions
2.1 Informal characterisation
We start with an informal characterisation of the model. The rm launches an innovative device
that constitutes an e¢ cient medium for interaction. The product supersedes older generations of
products serving similar interaction needs. The product itself has no intrinsic value as it is used
only when two people are interacting with each other. As a consequence, consumers who consider
buying the product need to estimate what proportion of other people in the market buy it. People
are heterogeneous with respect to attainable utility. For example, some people prefer to write
letters (the conventional way to interact) whereas some people prefer to use mobile phones (the
novel product). The rm on the other hand has to decide on the price of the product. A low price
may help solving buyerscoordination problem, but it erodes margins.
We think of products such as the fax machine or e-mail client software. These products are
relatively drastic innovations in the sense that they are not compatible with older generation
products (fax is not compatible with postal service or courier service, and early e-mail client
versions were not compatible with fax machines). Another, but less tting, example is the rst
generation mobile phones (in fact, the xed line telephony in late 1800s is a more suitable example
to our model). In the context of this model, mobile phones capacity to call xed network and
all standalone services should be abstracted away. However, the addition of some intrinsic value
would not change the results qualitatively2 .
The social relations of the population are represented by a network of nodes and links. Con-
sumers are located on the nodes. A link between two consumers (nodes) represents a social
relation. The origin for this relation is exogenous. It could base on e.g. family ties, friendships,
or occupational contacts. The mapping, or graph, of all social relations gives information about
who is interested in interacting with whom. If both end nodes buy the new product, we say that
2 See section 5.2.
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the link between them becomes active. An active link represents e¢ ciently mediated interaction
between consumers. Interaction forms the primary source of utility.
There tends to be multiple equilibria, because like any network model with positive exter-
nalities, our model is inherently a coordination game. Whenever coordination fails to reach the
Pareto-e¢ cient outcome, we say that there is a coordination failure in the market. Our model re-
lates coordination failure to situations where ex post demand falls short of the forecasted demand.
If this problem is extrapolated with a dynamic perspective, coordination failure occurs when
demand fails to grow above a critical level. The rms problem is how to bridge this "chasm"
between low and high equilibria3 . Multiplicity of equilibria has an economic perspective in this
paper, and therefore we do not seek to solve the problem4 . Instead, we justify theoretically the
use of the maximal coordination equilibrium. In our (positive) network externalities model, the
underlying coordination game is supermodular with positive spillovers. Consequently, the max-
imal coordination equilibrium Pareto-dominates other equilibria, which, we argue, focalises the
equilibrium.
2.2 Formal model
Let the population of individuals I = (1; :::; I) ; I 2 N be located on the graph G so that there
is a unique individual located on each node of the graph. The set of undirected edges between
the nodes of G is E : An edge represents a social relation. Two consumers i and j are neighbours
if they are connected by an edge, fi; jg 2 E : Undirectedness of all edges guarantees symmetry
so that, if (i; j) 2 E ) (j; i) 2 E : The set of neighbours of consumer i is Ni = fj 2 I n ig ; with
Ni 6= ; so that there are no isolated nodes. The consumer cannot be his own neighbour, i =2 Ni.
The neighbourhood Hi = fi;Nig of consumer i 2 G is dened as a collection of agent i himself
3 The taxonomy of bridging "the chasmbetween early and mass market adoption is due Moore (1999).
4 Our related paper, Sääskilahti (2005), focuses on solving the multiplicity problem. In that paper, we analyse
how equilibrium uniqueness is attainable in a monopoly model of network goods under perfect and imperfect
information. In both information regimes, key to uniqueness is that one group of agents has a strictly dominating
strategy to buy at the same time as another group has a strictly dominant strategy not to buy.
7
and the set of his neighbours Ni: Consumer i has an interest in interacting only with the people
in his neighbourhood. The structure of the graph G is common knowledge.
The problem for the consumer i 2 G is to choose action ai 2 fB;Ng ; where B = buy the new
device and N = do not buy. A link between neighbours becomes automatically active if both end
nodes buy the goods. The activity of link between i and j is represented by e (ai; aj)  eij : Dene
an active link between agents i and j as eij = 1: If only one agent buys or neither buy, the edge
remains inactive, eij = 0. An active link represents interaction between consumers mediated by
the new good.
Let the value of an inactive link be normalised to zero. This value represents the utility from
interaction with the help of older generation systems. Interaction generates positive utility when
it is facilitated by the new device. This can be thought as an e¢ ciency gain or additional utility
obtained from type of interaction not previously possible. Consumer i gets utility i from each
activated link. The value i is an i.i.d. random variable across consumers i 2 G. It is drawn from
a uniform distribution F () with the support

 ; +

; with    0. The distribution F () is
common knowledge. We assume that the valuation i for consumer i 2 G is independent of the
network location he occupies. Why is this so? The network inherits its structure from outside the
model. Links represent personal relationships with family members, friends and colleagues. These
contacts are formed prior to the model and they are independent of the value the consumer puts
on the new device. Exogeneity of the network rules out those cases where the new device (say a
mobile phone) would create a new link with a person formerly unknown to the consumer5 .
The question whether a link is active or not, builds another (technical) layer on top of the
inherent (social) network. This way, we di¤erentiate between the exogenous social network and
the endogenous technical network. The technical network can be completely active when all links
are activated, or it can be partially or totally inactive. On the contrary, the social network is
always a fully connected graph without isolated nodes. The following denitions characterise the
5 See section 5.2 for discussion on more complex utility specications.
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degree of activity on the technical network.
Denition 1 Technical network is said to be
(i) a complete network, when ai = B for all i 2 G:
(ii) an empty network, when ai = N for all i 2 G:
(iii) a partial network, when ai = B for at least one i 2 G and aj = N for at least one j 2 G;
i 6= j simultaneously.
A complete network corresponds to a network where all interaction is mediated by the new
product. A partial network is a network where some interaction is mediated by the new product.
In the empty network no-one uses the new product.
Throughout the paper we are interested in the role of the social networks structure on the
activity level on the technical network. We focus our attention on three di¤erent social networks.
 Complete graph, where each consumer is connected to everybody else, Ni = fG n ig for
all i 2 G: The complete graph is the structure used implicitly by conventional network
externalities models.
 Circle, where each consumer is connected to exactly two neighbours. When agents are
indexed in ascending order, the consumer labelled i has neighbours Ni = fi  1; i+ 1g. The
links form a circle, as consumer labelled I is connected to consumers I 1 and 1:
 Star, where one consumer is a central agent with connections to everybody else, and where
peripheral agents are linked only to the centre. Centres set of neighbours is NC = fG n Cg ;
where C is the index for the centre. A peripheral consumers only neighbour is the centre,
Ni = fCg ; i 2 fG n Cg.
The network is symmetric if all consumers have identical number of links. Network symmetry
implies that any two neighbourhoods are symmetric, but the reverse is not necessarily true. The
complete graph and the circle are symmetric and the star asymmetric. Complete graph, circle
and star are of course very primitive social networks. In spite of primitivity, they bring out the
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topological e¤ects missing in conventional externalities models, and e¤ects that are incorporated
in more general networks6 .
With I consumers, the complete graph has I (I   1) directed links, whereas the circle has 2I
and the star 2 (I   1) directed links. We can do a comparison across di¤erent networks either by
keeping the number of agents xed or keeping the number of links xed. By construction, the
complete graph generates the highest maximal value for a given number of consumers, because it
has the highest number of links. The second alternative holds the maximal value in the network (ex
ante) xed. There are I (I   1) links in total in the complete graph. Now, let us x this number.
The corresponding compensated number of consumers in the circle is I(I 1)2 . Respectively, the
compensated star has 1 + I(I 1)2 consumers.
3 Perfect information
We start with the case where all players observe perfectly all available information. The consumer
i receives utility ui (i; B) if he buys the product
ui (i; B) =
X
j2Ni
eiji   p; (1)
where eij = f0; 1g captures link activity, and p is the unit price for the device7 . If the consumer
does not buy, he receives zero utility. At the margin, the agent is indi¤erent between buying and
not when his valuation is
ei = pP
j2Ni eij
:
The better connected the agent is, the lower is his marginal value. A low valuation is compensated
by high number of (active) neighbours.
6 We discuss two general network types, namely the random network and the scale-free network, in section 5.3.
7 To be precise, eij indicates if the link becomes active when i buys the good, given that j buys the good. If
eij = 1; the link between i and j is potentially active, and it becomes active when i buys. Expectations on eij
are fullled in equilibrium. We can also write the utility with social relations explicitely expressed, ui (i; B) =P
j2fGnig gijeiji   p; where gij = f0; 1g indicates whether i and j are neighbours (gij = 1) or not (gij = 0).
If we write the utility as ui (i; B) = +
P
j2Ni eiji p; where  = 0 is the intrinsic utility from the good, we see
that the utility function is of type where consumers have di¤erentiated valuation of network benets. Such utility
formulation has been used by de Palma & Leruth (1996). Compare this with Katz & Shapiro (1985) specication
where consumers are di¤erentiated according to the intrinsic utility .
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The coordination game   consists of consumers I arranged on the graph G, pure actions
a 2 fB;Ng ; and payo¤s ui (N) = 0 and ui (B) given by equation (1) for all i 2 G, and it is
parameterised by the unit price p: Let aNi = (aj j j 2 Ni) be the vector of actions taken by
consumer is neighbours. Consumer is best response is ai 2 argmaxai2fB;Ng ui (i; ai;aNi) :
The best response depends on the price level, the realisation of ; and on neighbours. Nash
equilibrium (NE) of   is the strategy prole a = (a1; :::; a

I) which maximises consumers utility,
ui
 
i; a

i ;a

Ni
  ui  i; ai;aNi for all i 2 G:
Denition 2 Nash equilibrium with perfect information is the action prole
ai = B , i  ei
ai = N , i < ei ;
where ei = pP
j2Ni e

ij
and eij = e
 
ai ; a

j

for all i 2 G:
The coordination game has multiple equilibria. In particular, the empty network is always
NE. A total coordination failure occurs when all consumers play systematically, or "stubbornly",
a = N irrespective of valuations8 . When all consumers expect that no-one will buy, no-one will
buy in equilibrium. Due to an exogenous network structure, equilibria impaired with coordination
failure of smaller sets of consumers (than the total population) are also possible.
We argue that equilibrium selection is likely to favour e¢ cient coordination, although it is
impossible to provide a full proof of it.
Lemma 3 The coordination game   is supermodular with positive spillovers (action complemen-
tarity).
Proof.
(i) Action set a = fB;Ng is a compact subset of R:
(ii) The payo¤s show increasing di¤erences. If proportion k = jaj = Bj ; j 2 Ni of is neighbours
play B, the number of active links is
P
j2Ni eij = k when i plays also B: The payo¤ of
ai = B versus ai = N is vi (i; k) = ui (i; k; B)   ui (i; k;N) = ki   p: Then is payo¤
gain vi (i; k) is strictly increasing in i for all i 2 G:
8 Consider a duopoly where competition is in introduction of new products. Products are di¤erentiated by
quality. Farrell & Katz (1998) call consumersexpectations "stubborn in favor of rm k" when a consumer expects
that all other consumers prefer rm ks product irrespective of current market prices. All consumers buy always
from rm k; except in the cases where rival ls quality advantage is large enough to overcome the expected network
benets from the total network. Motivation for such stubborn expectations is in exogenous conditions, e.g. when
rm k has a strong nancial position compared to rival or it has a good reputation. Note that consumers are
perfectly rational, and the resulting equilibrium belongs to the class of fullled expectations.
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(iii) The payo¤ function ui : fB;Ng   ! R is continuous.
(iv) The payo¤ gain vi (; k) is strictly increasing in k:
Steps (i) - (iii) guarantee that the game   is supermodular. Positive spillovers result from (iv).
Topkistheorem guarantees that the supermodular game   has largest and smallest NE ele-
ments (Vives 2001, p. 33). The smallest NE is the empty network. The largest equilibrium, on
the other hand, depends on price p and corresponds to e¢ cient coordination. Due to positive
spillovers, the largest NE is Pareto-dominating (Vives 2001, p. 34). Note that positive spillovers
are limited to the consumers neighbourhood only. If there were higher order interaction benets,
e.g. if the consumer gets utility from interaction that takes place between his neighbours or neigh-
boursneighbours, then positive spillovers would exceed ones neighbourhood. Supermodularity
with positive spillovers apply to both symmetric and asymmetric social networks as long as the
underlying network is completely connected.
Pareto-dominance makes the equilibrium focal. Especially, allowing pre-game communication,
e¢ cient coordination should be more likely, although it is not guaranteed. Also the rm could help
coordination. There could be other focal points that favour e¢ cient coordination as well. Some
neighbours might be known to work in the high tech industry or be otherwise pro new technology.
Alternatively, macrofactors such as a technology boom could trigger e¢ cient outcomes. On the
other hand, technology antagonism works against e¢ cient coordination.
When considering the rms problem, we focus on the maximal NE. Denote b (p) as the largest
possible number of consumers who buy (the maximal NE). The function b (p) is conned in the
interval b (p) 2 [0; I] : b (p) is decreasing in p with possible large discontinuities (drops).
The rm observes the realisations of  and sets the price p. The rm cannot price discriminate
between consumers. If price discrimination was allowed, the rm would capture all surplus from
every consumer. The resulting technical network would always be a complete network. The pricing
problem becomes interesting when the rm must choose one price that applies to everyone.
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The rms problem is to maximise prots V = b (p) (p  c). Marginal cost is constant c > 0;
and there are no xed costs. The optimal price is given by equation (2) :
p = argmax
p
fb (p) (p  c)g : (2)
We have now characterised the model under perfect information in general terms. Next we
apply the general framework to three classes of social networks: complete graph, circle and star. We
rst describe the NE in each separate case. In section 3.4, we compare how NE prices and surpluses
di¤er in di¤erent social networks. Detailed analyses of the cases discussed in the comparison are
provided in appendix 8.1.
3.1 Complete graph
The specic location of a consumer on the underlying social network is irrelevant in a complete
graph because each consumer is connected to everybody else. Utility for consumer i can be written
as ui (i; B) =
P
j2fGnig eiji   p: NE of the coordination game when the network is a complete
graph can be expressed as in denition 4.
Denition 4 Nash equilibrium is the action prole
ai = N , i < pP
j2fGnig e

ij
ai = B , i  pP
j2fGnig e

ij
;
for all i 2 G:
All network forms are sustainable in equilibrium, conditional on price p and the realisations
of . Empty network is NE for example when all agents face aNi=fGnig = (N; :::; N) or, if for all
i : i <
p
I 1 : Complete network is a feasible NE only if for all i : i  pI 1 : Partial network is a
feasible NE if for at least one agent has i <
pP
k2fGnig eik
; and at least one agent j  pP
l2fGnjg ejl
,
i 6= j simultaneously.
In the price range p 2 (I   1)  ; (I   1) + the game can produce multiple equilibria. Con-
sider a complete graph of four agents with valuations 1 < 2 < 3 < 4: Let 3 > p, and assume
that 3 and 4 buy. If 31 > p; then the Pareto optimal NE is with all four agents buying.
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However, if also 22 < p holds, then we have two possible non-empty NE (and the empty network
NE). One where all four agents buy, and the other where only agents 3 and 4 buy.
The rm maximises prots V = b (p) (p  c) with price p 2 (I   1)  ; (I   1) +. Function
b (p) gives the largest number of agents who buy for a given price p: The function b (p) is decreasing
in p; with a ceiling b
 
(I   1)   = I and a oor b  (I   1) + + " = 0; where " > 0 is small.
Price p = (I   1)   guarantees that all agents buy in the maximal NE, and p = (I   1) + + "
guarantees that nobody buys. Example 8.1.1 in the appendix analyses how the rm sets price in
a four consumer complete graph.
3.2 Circle
In the circular network each consumer has exactly two neighbours. Utility from a = B can be
written as ui (i; B) = (ei;i 1 + ei;i+1) i  p: We obtain a three-partition of types. Low types are
consumers who never buy, their valuation satises 2 < p: Medium types are those who buy only
if both of their neighbours buy. Their valuations satisfy 12p   < p: High types are those who
buy if at least one of their neighbours buys,   p: To dene the NE fully, we need to consider
these three classes only.
Denition 5 Let a low type have a valuation  < 12p: Similarly, let a medium and high type have
valuations 12p   < p and   p respectively. The following action proles constitute NE:
(i) aNi = (N;N)) ai = N for all i 2 G:
(ii)

aNi = (B;N) or (N;B)) ai = N for low and medium types.
aNi = (B;N) or (N;B)) ai = B for high types.
(iii)

aNi = (B;B)) ai = N for low types.
aNi = (B;B)) ai = N for medium and high types.
We can infer from denition 5 that all activity levels are feasible as NE, conditional on price p
and realisations of : It is also evident that network structure matters more than in the case of a
complete network. The consumers action depends on the fact which types his neighbours happen
to be.
As an example of multiplicity of equilibria, consider a sequence of four agents of a circle, and
assume that the price is p 2  2 ; + : Assume that the agents at the ends of the sequence are
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high types and they play B in equilibrium, and the middle agents are of medium type. Then,
the middle agents can either both play B or N: Both (:::; B;B;B;B; :::) and (:::; B;N;N;B; :::)
constitute NE, but which one occurs is indeterminate.
The rm maximises prots V = b (p) (p  c) with price p 2 2 ; 2+. Function b (p) gives
the number of buyers in the maximal equilibrium. It is decreasing in p; with upper bound,
b
 
2 

= I, and lower bound b
 
2+ + "

= 0 (" small and positive). See example 8.1.2 in the
appendix for an example how the monopolist sets the price in a four consumer circle.
3.3 Star
The star formation is asymmetric with a single central agent who is connected to I   1 peripheral
agents. The peripheral consumers are connected only to the centre. Centres utility from buying is
uC (C ; B) =
P
i2NC eCiC p; NC = fG n Cg ; where the index C stands for "centre". Peripheral
consumers utility is ui (i; B) = eiCi  p; for all i 6= C: In any non-empty equilibrium the centre
buys the device.
Denition 6 Nash equilibrium is the action prole
(i) For centre C 2 G :
aNC = (N)
NC ) aC = N:
aNC = (ai)
i2NC ; and not all ai = N ) aC = N if C < pP
i2NC e

Ci
:
aNC = (ai)
i2NC ; and not all ai = N ) aC = B if C  pP
i2NC e

Ci
:
(ii) For all peripheral agents i 2 fG n Cg :
aC = (N) ) ai = N:
aC = (B) ) ai = N if i < p:
aC = (B) ) ai = B if i  p:
The rm has to set the price low enough to attract the central agent and at least one peripheral
consumer to buy. Let bC (p) be centres quasi-demand, and b (p) the largest number of peripheral
agents who buy for a given price p. Centres quasi-demand is a step-function
bC (p) =
8>><>>:
0; if p > uC
1; if p  uC
;
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where uC = b (p) C is the utility sum from active links: The lower and upper bounds for b (p)
are b
 
min

+; (I   1) C
	
+ "

= 0; and b
 
 

= I   1; which take into account centres and
peripherys topological di¤erences. Between the limits, the function b (p) is decreasing in p with
possible large drops. In order to evade the empty network, the rm must set bC (p) = 1: Hence,
the rms problem is to maximise prots, V = [1 + b (p)] (p  c) subject to p  uC : See example
8.1.3 in the appendix how the monopolist sets the price in a four consumer star.
3.4 Comparison of networks
In this section, we study the di¤erences between complete graph, circle, and star. It is a matter of
substance whether we should take the number of consumers or the value generated in the network
as the primitive of the model. In most cases, a xed number of consumers is the appropriate
set-up, since it is the consumer who makes the decision. However, the comparison across di¤erent
network types when the number of consumers is xed, comprises the size e¤ect (number of links)
and the topological e¤ect (link wiring). If we x the value of the network, we can isolate the
topological e¤ect on monopolys pricing strategy. Due to the overwhelming number of di¤erent
cases under perfect information, a comparison of compensated networks is insensible to carry out.
For example, a complete graph with four consumers corresponds to a compensated circle with six
consumers. A circle of six consumers has 720 permutations (of which half are mirror images).
Fortunately, it is easy to distinguish between the topological e¤ect and the size e¤ect.
Consider a complete graph, a circle and a star of four agents with valuations 1  2  3 
4: We assume c = 0 for expositional reasons. Table 1 gives rms prots in the maximal NE
for di¤erent social networks. Social networks are given in the rows, columns correspond to the
technical networks (activity level). Tables 2 and 3 in the appendix present consumer surplus
and total surplus (consumer surplus plus prots). The observations from the comparison are
summarised in the propositions 7-12. Since they are tendencies derived from a specic case, we
do not give any formal proofs of the propositions but discuss each one in the main text.
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Table 1: Prots, 1  2  3  4
Complete
network
3-buyer
network
2-buyer
network
Complete graph
q1 q2
q3q4
4 (31) 3 (22) 2 (3)
Circle A
q1 q2
q3q4
4 (21) 3 (2) 2 (3)
Circle B
q1 q3
q2q4
4 (21) 3 (min f22; 3g) Dominated
Star, 2 as centre
q1
q2
q3
q4
4 (1) 3 (min f22; 3g) Dominated
Star, 3 as centre
q1
q3
q2
q4
4 (1) 3 (2) 2 (3)
From the above table we can infer that alternative social structures support di¤erent optimal
monopoly prices. Optimal monopoly price is a¤ected by the number of links, the topology of the
social network, and agent conguration (which types are connected, e.g. circle A and B have the
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same topology, but are di¤erent congurations).
Proposition 7 Monopoly price is (weakly) increasing in the number of links in the social network.
When a link is added to the network, there are not consumers whose utility would be negatively
a¤ected by the addition prior any price modications. The addition may increase utility of some
consumers, which is the reason why the rm can potentially increase its price. A price increase
is feasible if the added link is not redundant so that the link e¤ectively eases pricing constraint.
This result is universal.
Proposition 8 (i) Complete graph generates the highest total surplus. (ii) Consumer surplus and
total surplus are maximised in a complete network in all social networks.
The more links there are in the network, the higher is the generated value in the network. Part
(ii) of proposition 8 is an implication of supermodularity. Since prots are just transfers from
consumer surplus, total surplus is maximised when the maximal number of links is activated.
Consumer surplus is maximised in the complete network because the price is the lowest in the
complete network.
Propositions 7 and 8 comprise the size e¤ect. A more complex issue is how the network
topology and agent conguration a¤ect the price level. Propositions 9-12 summarise these e¤ects.
Proposition 9 Agent conguration is irrelevant in pricing if the social network is a complete
graph. In other social network topologies, conguration matters.
Compare the circles A and B, and assume that a 3-buyer network maximises prots. The
networks di¤er only in the way who is connected to whom. Still, the monopolist makes higher
prots in B. Consumer 2 benets from the links with high types 3 and 4, and the rm is able
to capture some (or all) of this rent. In the circle A, the fact that low types are neighbours leads
to lower prots.
The role of social relations becomes more drastic when we compare 2-buyer networks. We see
that in the circle B and the star with 2 at the centre, 2-buyer networks are always dominated (in
terms of prots) by 3-buyer networks. On the contrary, in the circle A and the star with 3 at the
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centre, they do not have to be because high types are clustered. If a low valuation consumer is in
a focal position (2 in the circle B or in stars centre), the rm may be forced to sell at a lower
price in order to guarantee his participation.
There are two types of critical consumers who have connections that are important from
all network membersperspective. One type are focal topology-wise, e.g. the centre in a star.
The second, more subtle, type is focalised by high heterogeneity between the critical consumers
valuation and his neighbours valuations. Consumer 2 in the circle B is an example of this
type. His position constrains pricing only if his type is su¢ ciently low (22 < 3), otherwise the
important connections with high types 3 and 4 are redundant in the sense that his participation
is guaranteed. If 3 < 22; price is not constrained due to him, and his position is actually
benecial to the rm.
Proposition 10 Critical agents have (i) topologically central positions (e.g. centre in star) (ii)
connections with important network members (low types with high type neighbours). Critical agents
can increase prots or constrain the optimal price depending on the network topology and agent
conguration.
Under perfect information, the optimal monopoly price is determined by the combination of
consumer heterogeneity and social network structure. Consider the circles A and B again. Let
the complete network be optimal in A. This means that 81 > 32 and 81 > 23: Now, if we
also have 81 < 62 and 22 > 3 it is optimal for the rm to choose the 3-buyer network in B.
Why? The rm nds it protable to increase the price so that 1 opts out. At the same time,
the high types 3 and 4 induce their common neighbour 2 to purchase. Hence, in some graphs
the monopolist limits supply whereas in other graphs that are identical save the conguration
of agents, it covers the whole market even if it cannot price discriminate. Full coverage is more
likely when consumersrelative valuations are close together. In more heterogenous markets, the
monopolist is better o¤ by excluding the lowest types from the market by setting a su¢ ciently
high price. This trade-o¤ corresponds to the textbook case of monopoly mark-up.
Proposition 11 The rm excludes low types from the service in (relatively) heterogeneous mar-
kets. Homogeneous markets are completely covered.
19
Proposition 11 leads us to a more interesting result. When consumers are homogeneous,
the rm prefers to have high types dispersed in the network. Dispersed high types support the
purchases of lower types. On the other hand, if the valuations are highly heterogeneous, so that
the rm prefers to exclude low types from the service, dispersion of high types hurts the rm. It
would be better for the rm that high types are neighbours.
Proposition 12 In homogeneous markets, the dispersion of high types is good for the rm. In
heterogeneous markets, the dispersion of high types constrains the rm.
Figure (1) illustrates how monopolys choice a¤ects the total surplus created in the network.
We have used valuations 1 = 1; 2 = 2; 3 = 3; and 4 = 4 to illustrate. The activity level
that maximises prots is reported on the top line. The bottom line identies the underlying social
network. Total surplus is optimal prots plus consumer surplus. The maximum value equals
total surplus in the complete network. The network size e¤ect is clearly visible, as maximal value
increases in the number of links. Topological e¤ects come through in two ways. First, the star
with consumer 3 at the centre generates higher maximum value than star with consumer 2 at
the centre. What drives the di¤erence is supermodularity of the payo¤ function. Topological
e¤ects show up also in the total surplus. The total surplus in the circle B is only 55% of the total
surplus in the circle A. Respectively, total surplus in the star 2 is 92% of total surplus in the star
3. In the circle B and the star 2, total surplus is only 37% of total surplus in a complete graph.
The role of critical agents is evident when comparing surpluses of the circles A and B. In A,
the rm chooses complete network, which maximises total surplus, but in B, the rm excludes
1 from the network. This happens because the critical consumer 2 is the common neighbour
to high types 3 and 4 in B. The high types 3 and 4 require only one neighbour who buys.
Consumer 2 is of medium type, who needs both neighbours to buy before he buys. As a result,
1 is rendered redundant in the circle B and it pays o¤ to exclude him. The drop in the total
surplus is due to reduction in consumer surplus. In the circle B, the rm makes only 13% higher
prots compared with the circle A, but consumer surplus is reduced by 83%.
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Figure 1: Total surplus and maximal generated value.
A change in the opposite direction can be observed in the comparison between star 2 and star
3. There is a slight increase in total surplus in moving from star 2 to star 3. As the consumer
2 loses his preferential position as the centre, the rm lowers its price (from 3 to 2) in order to
include 2 in the network. The increase in consumer surplus o¤sets the decrease in prots.
Next, let us increase the valuation 3 from 3 to 3:5; while maintaining everything else. What
this apparently positive change does, is that it increases the maximal value in all networks. Total
surplus is increased in all networks except in the star with 3 as the centre. The total surplus in
star 3 is signicantly lowered (by 38%). Why? In the new situation the top two consumers have
valuations su¢ ciently higher than the two bottom ones. The new optimal network structure for
the rm is a 2-buyer network in star 3 (when with 3 = 3 it was a 3-buyer network). Exclusion
of both 1 and 2 increases rms prots by 17%. At the same time, consumer surplus is reduced
by 92%; which dominates the increase in prots. Due to 2s critical position, he is not excluded
in the star 2 or the circle B. The complete graph and the circle A remain fully covered.
The comparison of prots and consumer surplus has illustrated how they crucially depend on
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q1 q2
q3
q4
Figure 2: Insiders - Outsider
the underlying social relations. The comparison has revealed how the strength of network external-
ities can be overestimated. An assumption on a complete graph as the prevailing social structure,
when the true social structure is something less connected, produces signicantly exaggerated
estimates for consumer surplus and monopoly rents.
We close the analysis on perfect information with a counter-example which illustrates the
complexity perfect information creates. Consider a modied star network: "insiders-outsider"
illustrated in gure (2) with valuations 1 < 2 < 3 < 4: The consumer 1 has obviously a
preferential position. Let the rm prefer a 2-buyer network over a 3-buyer network, i.e. V2 =
2 (2) > V3 = 3 (21). But, if the outsider 4 has a very high valuation 31 < 4, the rm
may prefer the complete network over the 2-buyer network, even if buyersvaluations are very
heterogeneous. Let 31 < 2 < 61 ) V4 = 4 (31) > V2 = 2 (2) > V3 = 3 (21) : When this
holds, types 3 and 4 can di¤er signicantly from 1 and 2 (high heterogeneity), and the rm
still covers the whole market. Why is this possible? It is possible because of two factors. One, 3
and 4 are not neighbours, so the rm cannot sell only to them. Two, 1 has many links which
compensate his low valuation.
4 Asymmetric information
In this section, we limit the playersability to observe their opponentsvaluations. The valuations
 are now pure private information. Because s are i.i.d., the buyers are ex ante symmetric but
ex post heterogenous. The social network structure G and distribution F () remain common
22
knowledge.
Write ij as the probability consumer i puts on the event that his neighbour j buys the device.
The expected payo¤ from the link between i and j is independent from any other link i has.
Consequently, the expected payo¤ from link fi; jg to i is just iji; and jij to his neighbour j:
The consumer is expected utility from ai = B is the sum over all his links
E [ui (i; B)] =
X
j2Ni
iji   p: (3)
If the expected payo¤ from buying the product exceeds the reservation value of zero, the agent
makes the purchase. Buyers obviously benet from lower uncertainty over the purchasing decisions
of their neighbours, @E[ui(i;B)]@ij > 0 8i; j 2 Ni: At the margin, the consumers valuation is
ei (Ni) = pP
j2Ni ij
: (4)
Pure strategy for consumer i is ai :

 ; +
! fB;Ng ; and his best response is the switching
strategy ai = B; if i  ei (Ni) and ai = N; if i < ei (Ni) : The probability that consumer i
buys, given his beliefs over his neighboursactions ij and price p; is
i = 1  F

min
n
+;ei (Ni)o :
The coordination game with asymmetric information  AI consists of consumers I arranged
on graph G; pure actions a = fB;Ng ; types (i)Ii=1 with prior distribution F () ; and payo¤s
ui (N) = 0 and E [ui (B)] given by equation (3). The game   is parameterised by price p: Bayesian
Nash equilibrium (BNE) of  AI is characterised in denition 13.
Denition 13 Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the asymmetric information game  AI is the pure
strategy prole
ai = B , i  ei  Ni
ai = N , i < ei  Ni ;
where ei  Ni = pPj2Ni ij and i = 1  F minn+;ei  Nio for all i 2 G and i:
Supermodularity carries over to the asymmetric information regime.
Lemma 14 The coordination game with asymmetric information  AI is supermodular with pos-
itive spillovers.
Proof.
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(i) The set i 2 [0; 1] is a compact subset of R:
(ii) The payo¤s exhibit increasing di¤erences. Write the expected utility of action a = B versus
a = N as E [vi (i; ij)] = E [ui (i; B)]   E [ui (i; N)] = E [ui (i; B)] for all i 2 G and
j 2 Ni; where E [ui (i; B)] is given by equation (3). We have E

vi
 
0i; ij
  E [vi (i; ij)]
for all 0i > i:
(iii) The payo¤ function E (ui) : fB;Ng   ! R is continuous.
We conclude from (i) - (iii) that the game  AI is supermodular. Positive spillovers arise
because the payo¤ gain is strictly increasing in neighbours strategies, @E[vi(i;ij)]@ij > 0 for all
j 2 Ni:
The implications of supermodularity are familiar. It guarantees that there exists a largest and
a smallest equilibrium element. The smallest BNE is the empty network where i = 0 for all
i 2 G: On the other hand, the structure of any non-empty BNE depends on the price. Positive
spillovers mean that the largest BNE is Pareto-dominating, which, we argue, focalises the e¢ cient
equilibrium.
In contrast to the perfect information case, there may be agents whose ex post utility is
negative. Ex post, these agents would choose to play N as well. Similarly, all agents for whom
pP
j2Ni 

ij
> i >
pP
j2Ni jeij j
; where jeij j gives the ex post number of neighbours who bought the
device, holds and who played N; would like to have played B. These ex post ine¢ ciencies easily
arise with uncertainty over neighboursvaluations, whereas in the case of perfect information, ex
post ine¢ ciencies can arise only due to systematic irrational behaviour.
The rm maximises expected prots E (V ) =
P
i2G 

i [p (
)  c] : The rm cannot choose
the activity level directly, as it could with perfect information. Instead, we let the rm maximise
prots by choosing quantity, i.e. the probability i : The inverse demand p (
) is derived from
the BNE of the coordination game  AI :
We have now characterised the asymmetric information case in general terms. Next we study
the equilibria and pricing choices in a complete graph, a circle, and a star.
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4.1 Symmetric networks
Asymmetric information makes all symmetric networks (where each consumer has equal number
of neighbours) analytically the same. It only needs to understand that a symmetric social network
coupled with private information on  makes all agents ex ante homogeneous.
Lemma 15 With asymmetric information, each consumer i 2 G has an identical probability to
buy in a symmetric network.
Proof. Let n 2 [1; I   1] be the number of neighbours for consumer i in a population of I
that is arranged on a symmetric graph Gsym. By symmetry n is the number of neighbours for all
consumers. Assume rst that the probabilities are di¤erent so that for all other consumers except
i; the probability to buy is  and for i it is i < . We can write consumer is expected utility
from ai = B as
E [ui (i; B)] =
nX
k=0

n
k

k (1  )n k ki   p
= ni   p:
Similarly, the expected payo¤ for consumer j 6= i is
E [uj (j ; B)] =
n 1X
k=0

n  1
k

k (1  )(n 1) k kj + ij   p
= [(n  1) + i] j   p:
The equilibrium condition that consumer i buys is zi (B) = 1   F
 
min

+; pn
	
; and for all
other consumers except i it is z i (B) = 1  F

min
n
+; p(n 1)+i
o
: The functions zi () and
z i (i; ) are increasing in  and in (; i) respectively. If i <  holds, then it must also be that
zi () > z i (i; ) which leads to a contradiction with the initial assumption. The case i > 
leads to a corresponding contradiction. Hence, in the equilibrium it must be that i =  for all
i 2 Gsym:
Both the complete graph and the circle are symmetric networks. We work through a generalised
version of symmetric networks where all agents have n neighbours. For the complete graph
n = I   1 and for the circle n = 2: Note that some congurations are impossible. For example,
it is impossible to construct a symmetric network with ve agents each having three neighbours.
The generalised version does apply to complete graphs and circles of any number of consumers
though.
The expected payo¤ from ai = B can be written as E [ui (i; B)] = ni   p: The common
system of probabilities satises
 = 1  F

min
n
+;
p
n
o
: (5)
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Introduction of incomplete information in the model has reduced the number of equilibria.
However, the coordination problem is not entirely solved. There can be maximum of three di¤erent
equilibria. Firstly, the empty network is BNE. To see that the empty network is a BNE, substitute
 = 0 in equation (5). It is seen directly that all agents play a = N with probability one.
In addition, there can be at most two positive equilibria. In the interval  2 0; p
n+

; there
are no equilibrium values. To check the existence of positive equilibria, we solve the equation
 = 1 F   pn  for : Real roots exist when  +n2 4  +    np  0: In the cases where there
are two positive equilibria, the higher value is the maximal BNE. Lower equilibria are associated
with coordination failure. Supermodularity with positive spillovers guarantees that the maximal
BNE Pareto dominates.
The equilibrium condition (5) gives the inverse quasi-demand p (). In the area where +  pn
price is indeterminate, and the probability to buy is zero  = 0: The rm operates in the region
where price is determinate. The inverse demand is
p = n

+    +     :
The rm maximises prots by choosing the optimal level of . Firms expected prots are
E (V ) = I [p ()  c] : The rst order condition gives the standard monopoly mark-up rule
p ()  c
p ()
=
1

; (6)
where  is the optimal value and  =  @@p p(
)
 the elasticity of the quasi-demand:
Consider the special case of zero unit costs, c = 0. Equation (6) gives  = 2
+
3(+  ) ; and
p () =
2(+)
2
9(+  )n; which satisfy second order conditions
9 . The derived values represent the
desired equilibrium for the rm. When the obtained equilibrium price p () is plugged back into
equation (5), we can solve again for the corresponding equilibrium probabilities. As suggested,
9 @
2E(V )
@2

= 2
+
3(+  )
=  2+In < 0:
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there exists two positive equilibria
 =
+  13+
2
 
+     :
Denote the larger value, associated with the maximal BNE, as +. Firms expected prots are in
that case
E
 
V +

=
4
27

+
+    
2
+In:
The di¤erence in realised prots between the maximal BNE and the lower (positive) equilibrium
is
 
+    

p () = 12E
 
V +

: Empty network yields zero prots of course.
The maximal and empty network are Cournot tâtonnement stable BNE, whereas the lower
positive equilibrium is an unstable one. The checks for stability are provided in the appendix.
Because the low equilibrium is an unstable one, convergence occurs towards zero or the maximal
BNE, unless the tâtonnement process begins exactly at the lower equilibrium.
Expected total consumer surplus in the maximal BNE is given by
E (CS) = I
Z +
e f ()

n+   p

d
=
4
27

+
+    
2
+In
Expected consumer surplus equals prots, E (CS) = E
 
V +

.
We are ready to compare the asymmetric information model (with c = 0) with the results
from the perfect information case (propositions 7-12). We see from p () =
2(+)
2
9(+  )n that the
monopoly price is increasing in the number of links (agrees with proposition 7). For a given number
of consumers, the complete graph supports the highest price. However, symmetry has removed the
preferential roles that existed under perfect information. Agent conguration is irrelevant since
consumers are ex ante homogeneous (disagrees with propositions 9 and 10(ii)). In the circle B,
the consumer 2 was in a critical position under perfect information. The rm had to guarantee
his participation in order to evade the empty network. How the highest types are positioned in
the network does not a¤ect prots under asymmetric information (disagrees with propositions 11
and 12).
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Proposition 16 Monopoly price increases as the number of neighbours increases. Agent cong-
uration does not a¤ect monopoly price under asymmetric information.
It is obvious now that the complete graph corresponds to the conventional network externalities
model where the underlying social structure is abstracted away. When we take the probability
 as the fraction of the total population who buy, we arrive at a basic membership externality
model where the agents utility increases as the number of people join the network.
Complete graph generates highest total surplus (E
 
V +

+ E (CS)), which agrees with results
from the perfect information case (proposition 8). Both equilibrium prots and expected con-
sumer surplus increase also as n is increased. This brings up the problem of overestimation of
network externalities. If we use the complete graph, when the true social network is something
less connected, we end up exaggerating the surplus generated in the network.
To see what the impact of heterogeneity is, we apply a mean-preserving spread

    x; + + x
on the uniform distribution of types F () : We can write the expected consumer surplus, which
equals maximal BNE prots, as
E (CS) =
4
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+ + x 
+ + x
       x
!2  
+ + x

In: (7)
To see the e¤ect of increased heterogeneity, di¤erentiate (7) with respect to x:We get that marginal
increase in heterogeneity hurts both the consumers and the rm. The reason is that increased
heterogeneity increases uncertainty in the model. Consumers valuations are pure private in-
formation, so the uncertainty over neighbours increases. The rm, on the other hand, cannot
distinguish between networks where high types are neighbours and networks where high types are
dispersed. Hence, it is incapable of taking advantage of clusters of high types, as it could with
perfect information (disagrees with propositions 11 and 12).
Increased heterogeneity leads the monopoly to reduce its price in general, @p

@x =  
4(++x)(  x)
9(+  +2x)2
<
0 which is negative when   > x > 0; but positive with   = 0: Increased uncertainty reduces the
probability to buy
@+
@x =  
2(++ )
3(+  +2x)2
< 0:
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Proposition 17 Surplus e¤ects:
(i) Complete graph supports the highest expected consumer surplus and maximal BNE prots.
(ii) Increased heterogeneity decreases expected consumer surplus and maximal BNE prots.
Proof.
(i) Both E (CS) and V + are strictly increasing in n: So the maximum is reached at complete graph
n = I   1:
(ii) @E(CS)@x =
@E(V +)
@x =
4
27In
(++x)
2
(+  +2x)3
   + + x  3      x ; which is negative when
   0 and x is small.
The asymmetric information case is analytically easier to handle than perfect information
case, because agent conguration plays no role. Some of the predictions of the perfect information
case hold, but some are invalidated. The asymmetric information case is more suitable for large
social networks, where each agent has many connections. The adverse possibility to overestimate
generated surplus is more serious in larger networks however.
4.2 Star
For the star, we obtain an equilibrium system that comprises two distinct probabilities for buying.
One is for the centre and the other for peripheral agents. The rm has to choose a price that
applies to all consumers. This assumption creates a price bias in favour of the centre. We allow
price discrimination in section 4.3.
Consumersutilities are E [uC (C ; B)] =
P
j2NC CiC   p for the centre, and E [ui (i; B)] =
iCi  p for peripheral agent i 2 fGCg : Since peripheral consumers are a priori symmetric, by
lemma 15, their behaviour is characterised by a common probability. The centre places probability
Ci =  on the event that a peripheral consumer i 2 fGCg buys. Each peripheral consumer
i 2 fGCg places probability iC = C that the centre buys.
Lemma 18 BNE in a star is characterised by (C ; ), where C is the probability that the centre
buys and  is the probability that a peripheral agent buys. The equilibrium satises
C = 1  F

min
n
+; p(I 1)
o
 = 1  F

min
n
+; pC
o (8)
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Proof. Proof is obtained directly from lemma 15 and uses the symmetry property. By symme-
try, the centre must apply identical probability  to all peripheral agents, and all peripheral agents
hold identical beliefs over the centres behaviour C when information is asymmetric.
The rm solves the prots maximisation problem by choosing the probability : As in symmet-
ric networks, asymmetric information eliminates the role of agent (type) conguration in pricing.
From system (8) we get the market clearing price and the centres probability to buy as a function
of 
p () = C ()

+    +    
C () =
+ (I   1)
+ + (I   2)  +    
Peripherys and centres strategies are complements in the sense @C@ > 0: The di¤erence
between probabilities is C    = (
+ (+  ))
++(+  ) which is always non-negative, saying that the
probability that the centre buys is higher than the probability that a peripheral agent buys.
The rm maximises expected prots E (V ) = [C () + (I   1)] [p ()  c] : The FOC gives a
modied inverse elasticity rule
p ()  c
p ()
=
1

(
2+ + (I   2)  +     + + (I   2)  +     
+
2
+

+ + (I   2)  +    2
)
; (9)
where  =  @@p p(
)
 is the price elasticity of the quasi-demand of a peripheral agent.
Because the result (9) is di¢ cult to use analytically, let us consider the specic case with zero
unit costs and a uniform distribution   Unif [0; 1] with a non-degenerate star (I  3). In this
case, there is only one real root to the equation (9) in the range  2 (0; 1) ; which yields positive
prots10 , and the corners  = f0; 1g yield zero prots. Hence, the only real root in the range
 2 (0; 1) is in fact the global maximum. Because the derivative @E(V )@ at point  = 23
 
 = 13

is positive (negative), the optimal  must be in range 13 < 
 < 23 : So, the probability to buy
for a peripheral consumer is less than the probability to buy in symmetric graphs. The mark-up
10 Second order conditions for maximal prots are satised for the non-zero equilibrium. This can be checked
numerically for the particular case c = 0; + = 1;   = 0. We have @
2E(V )
@2
< 0 for I  3. A stability check for the
equilibrium is in the appendix.
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associated with the periphery is therefore higher than the standard monopoly mark-up associated
with symmetric graphs.
Proposition 19 A consumer in the periphery has a lower probability to buy, and the centre has
a higher probability to buy, compared with a consumer in a symmetric network.
Proposition 19 states that the topological e¤ect on the monopoly price is never latent under
asymmetric information. The rms pricing strategy resembles those cases of perfect information
where the centre is a binding constraint to pricing (because the centre has su¢ ciently low valua-
tion). In the case of asymmetric information, the rm always takes into account the topologically
focal centre by guaranteeing him a higher probability to buy.
Next it can be veried that the optimal  is decreasing in I; whereas the optimal C = C (
)
is growing in I: The centre benets the more people join his neighbourhood. More interestingly,
a peripheral consumer is negatively a¤ected by an additional peripheral consumer, even though
the additional agent does not a¤ect his neighbourhood directly. Why? The centres probability to
buy increases as a peripheral agent is added. The rm can compensate this addition by increasing
the price. Numerical runs show that as I grows very large, the optimal  approaches 12 ; and
the optimal C approaches
I 1
I  1: In the minimal case where I = 3; the optimal values are
  0:5971 and C  0:7478: The larger the periphery is, the higher is the centres market
power thus larger the surplus he captures. This happens whether the centre is actually a pricing
constraint in the respective perfect information game or not. The monopoly price is the lowest
at I = 3; where it equals p ()  0:3012: As the periphery becomes very large, the optimal price
approaches 12 : Prots and the total expected consumer surplus (centres surplus plus peripherys
surplus) increase in the number of peripheral consumers.
Proposition 20 The e¤ect of changes in the size of periphery:
(i) The centre benets the larger the periphery is.
(ii) A peripheral consumer is adversely a¤ected by an addition of a new peripheral consumer.
(iii) Prots maximising price increases as the number of peripheral agents increases, and the
rms prots increase. Total consumer surplus increases as the periphery grows.
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Figure 3: Uncompensated total surplus (log scale),   Unif [0; 1] ; c = 0:
Proposition 20 agrees with the size e¤ects of perfect information regime, as well as, with the
symmetric networks case under asymmetric information.
Consider a spread   Unif [ x; 1 + x] ; x > 0 and small. Although we now give the lowest
type a negative valuation, it does not a¤ect results as long as the spread we consider is small. The
lowest type already had a dominant strategy a = N for any given positive price p: A numerical run
shows that the rm increases the optimal price for a small x: However, the increase in uncertainty
has a negative e¤ect on prots and consumer surplus.
Proposition 21 Small increase in uncertainty decreases equilibrium prots, and total consumer
surplus associated with the periphery and the centre.
4.3 Comparison and price discrimination
We close the analysis of the asymmetric information variant with a comparison of the symmetric
networks and the star. We ignore the integer problem in order to get results easily illustrated,
thus I  3 and continuous. We rst conrm the results about the size factor.
Figure (3) illustrates how the complete graph (dotted line) generates far higher total surplus
(prots plus consumer surplus) than the uncompensated circle (dashed line) or star (solid line)
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do. This is because each additional consumer induces 2 (I   1) new links in the complete graph
whereas only two in the circle and the star.
For small numbers of consumers, the circle produces higher total surplus compared to the
star, but for large networks, the star generates higher total surplus. The solid line crosses the
dashed line just before the number of consumer reaches I = 30: The circle always has 2 links
(one two-directional link) more than the star, which returns higher consumer surplus for small
networks. The star, however, supports inherently lower price than symmetric networks, thus
for large networks consumer surplus is higher in the star. Since the rm maintains its strategy
constant with respect to the number of consumers in the circle, but adjusts its price in the star as
the number of consumers is increased, the relation between the two surpluses changes. In small
star networks, the rm is more pressed to set a low price in order to attract the centre. As the
periphery grows in number, the rm increases its price as it compensates (negatively) for larger
periphery.
Because the rm maintains a lower price in the star than in a symmetric network, and because
there are less links in the star network, rms prots are the lowest in the star for a given number
of consumers.
We can isolate the topological e¤ect by comparing compensated networks. The comparison of
compensated networks shows how the monopoly price changes when network topology changes,
while the maximal value of the network is kept constant. Let us x the maximal value generated in
the complete graph of size I: A compensated circle has IC =
I(I 1)
2 consumers and a compensated
star Is =
I(I 1)+2
2 consumers.
From picture (4) we can read that the rm is the worst o¤ in the star network of compensated
size. The asymmetric network structure constrains the rm. As a result, consumer surplus is
higher in the compensated star than in the circle or the complete graph. Total surplus is higher
in the compensated star network due to higher consumer surplus. This is seen in gure (5) :
In the star, the centres market power reduces rms prots. When price discrimination is
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Figure 4: Compensated prots,   Unif [0; 1] ; c = 0:
Figure 5: Compensated total surplus,   Unif [0; 1] ; c = 0:
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forbidden, the rm always sets a price such that the centre is more likely to purchase than a pe-
ripheral agent. Hence, there arises the question, if the rm could benet from price discriminating
with respect to the network position. Under perfect information, both symmetric and asymmetric
networks hold incentives to price discriminate. Basically, the rm could capture all surplus from
each consumer. When we introduce asymmetric information, all heterogeneity that prevails a
priori in the symmetric networks is eliminated, so that there are no means to price discriminate.
In asymmetric networks, network location-based price discrimination is feasible.
With price discrimination, the equilibrium probability system in the star is
C = 1  F

min
n
+; pC(I 1)
o
 = 1  F

min
n
+; pC
o :
Prices pC for the centre and p for the periphery are determined separately. The rm maximises
expected prots E (V ) = C [pC (C ; )  c] + (I   1) [p (C ; )  c] by choosing (; C) :
Let unit costs be zero, c = 0: Solving the prots maximisation problem gives the optimal
probabilities
C = 
 =
2+
3
 
+     :
Proposition 22 Price discrimination removes the bias that was in favour of the centre.
By price discriminating, the rm of course captures a larger share of maximal value generated
in the network. If we consider the case   Unif [0; 1] ; c = 0; and compensated networks. It is
straightforward to calculate that price discrimination increases the rms prots to the same level
as in the compensated symmetric networks. Respectively, total consumer surplus falls to the level
of symmetric networks.
Two important insights can be drawn from this section. One, the complete graph generates
the highest surplus for a given number of consumers. This means that use of a complete graph as
a mapping of social relations calls for caution. There is a possibility to overestimate the value of
the network, when the true network is something less-connected. When the size of the population
35
is large, the estimate of the value can be seriously exaggerated. Two, network topology matters
for price strategy, and consequently for how the surplus is split between players. Considering
the compensated networks, the social optimum is the star network. The monopoly power of the
rm is reduced due to the asymmetric network topology. The centre captures a large part of the
rents, which happens at peripherys cost. The monopoly, on the other hand, prefers a symmetric
network. If the rm is able to price discriminate, it can increase its prots, and in the special
case   Unif [0; 1] ; c = 0; the rm reaches the same prots level as in the symmetric networks.
However, price discrimination leads to an e¢ ciency loss as the consumer surplus is reduced more
than the rm gains.
5 Extensions
We conclude the analysis with few extrapolations on the basic model.
5.1 Investments in entry under asymmetric information
Symmetric networks produce multiple equilibria under asymmetric information. If the rm was
certain that the maximal equilibrium is the correct one, it would be willing to invest up to E
 
V +

to enter the market. More generally, we could assume that the rm holds beliefs k 2 [0; 1] on
the possible equilibrium k; with
P
k k = 1: Maximum acceptable sunk cost to enter the market
is then  =
P
k kE (V k ) ; where E (V k ) are the expected prots from equilibrium k.
In growth industries, in the early development stages, forecasting future states of the world
involve highly qualitative and subjective metrics that make it di¢ cult to estimate k. Therefore,
it should not come as a surprise that many (most) of the dotcoms that founded their business
models on increasing returns found themselves insolvent in a short time. Secondly, dotcoms
business models were often "eyeball game" strategies where network externalities were assumed to
generate demand automatically. Such business models did not take into account consumerslocal
and asymmetric social relations, which, as we have shown, reduce the strength of network e¤ects.
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5.2 Interaction propagation and intrinsic utility
The main model presents a very specic utility function, in which each link generates value  for
the consumer. In other words, utility is independent of the counter party of the social relation,
and it only depends on the number of neighbours. A consumer induces an indirect externality to
his neighbourhood. His own high probability to buy increases neighboursprobabilities to buy.
The motivation for this specication is that high types enjoy more of the novel device from each
social relation they have. For example, high type can be a synonym for a technically able person.
Such a person is likely to get more out of new technology than those people who nd new gadgets
di¢ cult to use.
However, it would not be unrealistic that the value of the new device also depended on the
social relation. Some contacts could be more important than others. Ideally, we could impose a
value distribution from which the value of each link is drawn. Allowing this kind of heterogeneity
between links, inevitably necessitates expanding the model to discuss also usage decisions in
addition to the plain buying decision. This is an area that calls for further research. For a
model with a exogenous symmetric social network structure and buying and usage decisions, see
Sääskilahti (2005).
Alternatively, utility could be a function of both parties valuations. This way, high types
induce a direct positive externality to their neighbours, in addition to the indirect externality. For
example, a sharing rule of the following kind could capture the desired "propagation" dynamics.
Consider the link between consumers i and j: Consumers contribute agent-specic values i and
j to an active link. The active link generates total utility of ij (i; j) : In the simplest form,
generated utility presents constant returns when ij (i; j) = i+ j : Utility generation of course
can present decreasing (@v(i;j)@k < 1; k = i; j) or increasing returns (
@v(i;j)
@k
> 1; k = i; j).
Total utility is shared by the consumers according to a rule, by which a share rij = r (ij)
goes to consumer i and 1   rij goes to j: Basically, the sharing rule could be anything. The
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sharing rule complicates the analysis a great deal as it does away with symmetry properties. The
consumer must now think about what types his neighboursneighbours are, what their neighbours
neighboursneighbours are, potentially ad innitum. The solution to this problem might require
a limitation on consumer rationality (e.g. myopic consumers), which in general is undesirable.
There is an interesting connection between increasing returns interaction and telecommunica-
tions models. Cambini & Valletti (2005) present a conventional telecommunications model with
call propagation features. Their model builds on the Armstrong (1998) - La¤ont et al. (1998)
paradigm. Interaction network is assumed a complete graph, where every consumer has a social
relation with all other consumers. When consumers interact pair-wise, interaction propagates in
the sense that calling induces calls back. The more one consumer calls the other, the more the
other consumer calls back. Hence, their model incorporates the direct externality, but abstracts
away heterogeneity in social relations.
In the main model, we have assumed that there is no intrinsic utility associated with the good.
Inclusion of intrinsic utility would not change the results qualitatively. It could facilitate analysis,
by removing some possible equilibria. In fact, equilibrium uniqueness is reachable if we impose
su¢ cient heterogeneity between consumers with respect to intrinsic utility (see Herrendorf et al.
2000). The key to uniqueness is that we have one group of consumers who buy as a strictly
dominant strategy, independent of other peoples strategies, at the same time as another group
does not buy as a strictly dominant strategy. Under perfect information, this results to equilibrium
uniqueness. Under asymmetric information, the model is easily turned into a game of correlated
private values. Such a set-up allows to use global games techniques to derive a unique equilibrium.
Our related paper Sääskilahti (2005) does a comprehensive analysis on equilibrium uniqueness in
a model of monopoly pricing of network goods under perfect and incomplete information.
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5.3 Random and scale-free networks
Our selection of social networks has been limited. Complete graph, circle, and star obviously do
not characterise fully any real social network. Our choice, of course, corresponds to the most
primitive network congurations that induce di¤erent pricing strategies. The limited number of
cases is not di¤erent from the general literature on social networks. It is typical that any large-
scale network turns out to be analytically cumbersome. However, the results that come out of the
literature have clear predictions on more complex networks. Our results fare no worse.
There are two classes of networks that are of particular interest. Random networks (Erd½os-
Rényi model) and scale-free networks (see Albert & Barabási (2002) for technical review and
Barabási & Bonabeau (2003) for informal discussion).
Random networks theory associates graphs with some specied probabilistic characteristics.
The nice feature about random networks is that despite randomness, they present a large degree of
regularity. Regularity is captured in the probabilistic characteristics of the network, in particular,
in the average number of links a member has. The number of links, or the degree ni, of a node
i is given by a binomial distribution Pr fni = ng =
 
I 1
n

n (1  )I 1 n for a population of I
individuals.  is the connection probability between two (randomly chosen) nodes. The apparent
a priori regularity of random graphs, makes them potentially very applicable. The players would
then take expectations on the valuation as well as on the number of links. It is straightforward
to see that the results of our model carry on to random network settings. Because consumers
are a priori symmetric, the rm sets prices in similar fashion to the symmetric networks under
asymmetric information. Sundararajan (2005) constructs a model of local interaction where the
underlying social network is a random graph, but focuses on the equilibria of the network members
game without the monopoly pricing problem.
Scale-free networks lack the regularity of random networks. They cannot be characterised by an
average number of links. The unifying characteristic of scale-free networks is that the degree of the
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network follows a power distribution P ()    ; where the degree  captures the connectedness
of a network member. The power law tells that in a scale-free network there are only a handful
of members who have very many links, and a very large number of members with only very few
links. Scale-free networks are common, as they characterise certain social interaction networks
(sexual relationships, academic collaboration), the Internet, even protein interaction networks in
the human body. The star we have analysed approximates scale-free networks. Our insights from
the star extend to general scale-free networks.
A scale-free network is very tolerant towards random elimination of links, but very vulnerable
towards targeted removal of the topologically focal hubs. Ballester et al. (2004) show how crime
is best prevented by a "key player removal" policy. Elimination of the hub criminals destroys the
crime network in the most e¢ cient way. Reversely, di¤usion of diseases or innovations occurs very
rapidly in scale-free networks, because the hubs spread information very e¢ ciently. This can be
compared with random networks, where information travels with far less speed. In our model,
the rm can remove the empty network equilibrium by providing free goods to some consumers.
Provision of free goods corresponds to "piloting" where the rm tests the novel device with a
selected group of consumers before the commercial launch. Piloting has two functions. One, pilot
users spread information about the goods (create latent demand). Two, they help in product
development by testing the product in real life situations. In the star network, the rm should
target the centre for the most rapid deployment of information about a new device. On the other
hand, the centre is a potential source for large rents, so it may be more protable to provide
free goods to a few peripheral agents instead. The rm could then rely on indirect information
transmission through the centre to other peripheral agents.
Chwe (2000) presents a model where agents coordinate their actions with the help of a com-
munication network. Chwes (2000) primary interest is in political action, but the model has
important implications on di¤usion of new products as well. His analysis on how agents time
their actions is particularly valuable. The analysis allows to categorise agents into social roles like
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"early adopters" and "followers". He analyses how the network structure a¤ects the di¤usion of
an action11 . Chwe (2000) also discusses how initial seeding of agents who are biased towards
revolting a¤ects the di¤usion speed. This is an analogy to how to choose pilot customers: whether
pilot users should be dispersed in the network or clustered.
Granovetter (1973) introduced the concept of weak and strong links. A strong link network
means that most of one consumers neighbours are also his neighboursneighbours: "My friends
friends are also my friends". News or innovations travel faster in weak link networks where
neighbourhoods overlap little. Di¤erentiation between weak and strong link networks has two
implications to our model. If the consumer has not bought the device and his neighbours have
not bought it either, then having weak links is better, since the impact of someone outside the
neighbourhood who has bought the good travels greater distance. On the other hand, if the
consumer has bought the device, then it is better to have strong links. Why? Strong links are good
because neighbours observe that the consumer has bought the device, plus they know that their
neighbours observe also that the consumer has bought the device. Since neighboursneighbours
tend to be the buyers neighbours also, the purchase induces an e¤ective positive externality in a
strong link neighbourhood.
6 Conclusions
We have analysed monopoly pricing of social goods when the market is characterised by social
relations. The model presents a stylised version of coordination goods such as mobile phones,
e-mail clients, or online game consoles. We have showed that in markets where social relations are
important the conventional models of network externalities fall short and need to be rened. In
particular, the implicit assumption of a completely connected graph that does away all topological
asymmetries can result in serious overestimation of network e¤ects. Consequently, both achievable
monopoly rents and total surplus generated in the network become exaggerated. Our model is
11 Gladwell (2000) discusses social roles in networks. He reports how political revolt, crime, or product penetration
hinges on the information reaching the critical agents (i.e. social roles) at a proper time.
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an improved treatment of markets of communication goods, where social relations determine the
patterns of interaction, and consequently determine the demand for the good.
Key ndings of the paper are that social relations play a role in rms pricing strategy. The
optimal monopoly price is (weakly) increasing in the number of links in the network. More
interestingly, the optimal price is a¤ected by the network topology. Agent conguration also
matters under perfect information.
Agents who have important connections capture a higher surplus compared to more periph-
eral agents. Under perfect information, focal positions can arise in symmetric and asymmetric
networks. A preferential position is either due to central network position (network topology)
or due to important neighbours (agent conguration). Once agentsvaluations are private infor-
mation, the preferential positions in symmetric networks are eliminated. However, topologically
central agents in asymmetric networks capture always higher surplus than peripheral agents. This
contrasts the results from perfect information regime where a preferential position is always de-
pendent on other agents. Especially, a topologically central position can be redundant if the agent
occupying that location does not constrain the rm by having a relatively low valuation.
Total surplus is maximised in the complete network (full activity). However, private (monopolys)
incentives to cover the market tend to di¤er from social optimum. In the case of perfect infor-
mation, the rm chooses to cover the whole market in one social structure, and in another, in all
aspects identical network except in terms of who is connected to whom, it chooses to limit supply.
Its price strategy depends on the network topology, and on the conguration and heterogeneity
of agents. The rm chooses a partial (technical) network in cases where consumer heterogeneity
is high and high types form tight clusters.
Heterogeneity between consumers can benet the rm under perfect information. Prots
increase as heterogeneity increases if the high type consumers are clustered. When the high types
are each othersneighbours, the rm can charge a high price from them and exclude low types
from the service. If the high types are dispersed in the network, low typesparticipation is needed
42
to have a non-empty network, and therefore the rm does not benet from increased heterogeneity.
Asymmetric information turned out to be analytically more straightforward. Much of the com-
plexity of perfect information was eliminated as the role of agent conguration lost all importance.
The number of neighbours (each member has) is the only network-specic parameter which a¤ects
the optimal price. Monopoly pricing induces always an e¢ ciency loss. The lowest types are ex
ante excluded. As the number of links grows, monopoly increases its price. Higher heterogeneity
equals higher uncertainty that reduces prots and consumer surplus.
In asymmetric networks, the rm chooses a price that guarantees a higher probability to buy
for the central agents under asymmetric information. Monopoly price is increasing in the size
of the periphery, and the centre and the periphery get opposite surplus e¤ects as the number of
peripheral agents is increased. An additional peripheral consumer increases the expected utility
of the centre. A peripheral agent is not directly a¤ected by the additional consumer, however,
increased price decreases his expected utility.
When we compare the compensated networks under asymmetric information, we see that the
star is the social optimum, but the rm prefers a symmetric network. If the rm is allowed to price
discriminate, its prots rise to the level it obtains in the symmetric networks. Price discrimination
reduces total surplus as consumer surplus drops more than prots increase.
We have focused on the static properties of social networks. An obvious extension would be
to expand the model in time, as a multi-period model would shed light on optimal price paths. It
would be interesting to see what is the order of purchases in asymmetric networks. More complex-
ity could be added by allowing direct externalities in link activation. Finally, allowing transfers or
communication between consumers would introduce signalling aspects in the coordination game
under asymmetric information. The interesting question is then how the rm could benet from
high typespreferences to signal their types to neighbours.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Perfect information examples
8.1.1 Complete graph
Example 23 Consider a complete graph with four consumers. Let the valuations be 1 < 2 <
3 < 4; and c < 31 so that costs do not constrain rms decisions. Complete network is feasible
only if p  31: Partial network with three buyers is feasible if max f31; 3g < p  22; and with
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two buyers if max f31; 22g < p  3: We omit the uninteresting case of the empty network12 :
Firms prots are V4 = 4 (31   c) ; V3 = 3 (22   c) ; and V2 = 2 (3   c) respectively. Depending
on the relative values of 1; 2 and 3 (the highest type does not matter), the rm chooses between
a complete network and a partial network of either 2 or 3 buyers. A comparison of prots suggests
that complete network is chosen if valuations are close together.
 Complete network: V4 > V3 and V4 > V2 , 1 > max

1
22 +
1
12c;
1
63 +
1
6c
	
.
Partial 3-buyer network is chosen when middle valuations 2 and 3 are close together, but
signicantly higher than 1:
 3-buyer network: V3 > V4 and V3 > V2 , 2 > max

21   16c; 133 + 16c
	
:
Partial 2-buyer network is chosen when there is a large di¤erence between the two lowest and
the two highest valuations.
 2-buyer network: V2 > V4 and V2 > V3 , 3 > max

61   c; 32   12c
	
.
When the market is relatively homogenous in terms of consumers valuations, the rm will
choose a complete network in the equilibrium. It benets from high sales volumes. Even if the
monopolist is unable to price discriminate, it may choose to cover the whole market. On the other
hand, if agents are heterogenous, then it pays o¤ to exclude low types from the market by charging
a high price.
8.1.2 Circle
Example 24 Consider a circular network with four consumers with valuations 1 < 2 < 3 <
4; and c < 21 so that costs do not interfere pricing, and focus on the maximal equilibrium.
Immediately, we can see that there are two cases that yield di¤erent results. In the case A, the
high valuation types 3 and 4 are neighbours (a circle where 1 has neighbours 2 and 3, and
where his neighbours are 2 and 4 yield identical results). In the case B, they are not. The
network structure sets limits to the rms choices in the case B. Consumer 2 located between 3
and 4, holds a critical position. Any non-empty equilibrium must include him. In both cases,
complete network occurs if 21  p; and rms prots are V4 = 4 (21   c) : Partial network with
three buyers is feasible in the case A if 21 < p  2; and in the case B if 21 < p  min f22; 3g :
Partial network with two buyers is feasible in the case A if max f21; 2g < p  3: Two buyer
network is always dominated by other structures in the case B. We skip the uninteresting case of
the empty network13 . The rm chooses the complete network only when consumers valuations
are su¢ ciently close together.
 Complete network in the case A: V4 > V A3 and V4 > V A2 , 1 > max

3
82 +
1
8c;
1
43 +
1
4c
	
:
 Complete network in the case B: V4 > V B3 , 1 > 38 min f22; 3g+ 18c:
The rm chooses a three buyer network in both cases if the lowest type has a signicantly lower
valuation, and the other consumers have valuations not too di¤erent from each other.
 3-buyer network in the case A: V A3 > V4 and V A3 > V A2 , 2 > max

8
31   13c; 233 + 13c
	
:
 3-buyer network in the case B: V B3 > V4 , min f22; 3g > 831   13c:
12 Price p > max f31; 22; 3g guarantees an empty network in the maximal NE. Firms prots are V0 = 0 in
this case.
13 In the case A, price p > max f21; 3g yields an empty network. In the case B, empty network is produced
with price p > max f21; Mg ; where M = min f22; 3g : Prots are zero in both cases.
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In three buyer networks, the rm benets if the high types (3 and 4) are dispersed in the
network. We have V A3 < V
B
3 always. High types support the purchases of their common neighbour
2; so that network conguration relaxes rms pricing constraint.
The rm chooses a two buyer network in the case A when the two highest types have signicantly
higher valuations compared with the two lowest types. In the case B, two buyer network is always
dominated either by the complete network or the three buyer network.
 2-buyer network in the case A: V A2 > V4 and V A2 > V A3 , 3 > max

41   c; 322   12c
	
:
In general when the agents have valuations close together, the rm prefers the complete network,
and if the high types have signicantly higher valuations than the low types, the rm chooses a
partial network. This relation is disturbed by the way consumers are arranged. Segregation between
two highest types and two lowest types may be blocked by the agent conguration, as it happens in
the case B.
When the di¤erence in valuations of two highest and two lowest types grow large, so that we
have 3 > max

41   c; 322   12c
	
; the rm strictly prefers two buyer network. In the case A,
this causes no problems to the rm as it can exclude 1 and 2 from the market. However, in the
case B, the network structure may constrain the rm. It is forced to sell to three consumers, which
yields lower prots if 2 < 133 +
1
6c. In this case, the rm prefers the case where 3 and 4 are
neighbours. Respectively, if we have 3 < max

41   c; 322   12c
	
; then the rm is better o¤ if
high types are dispersed in the network.
8.1.3 Star
Example 25 Consider the following four consumer example with a centre and three peripheral
agents. Let the peripheral consumersvaluations be c < 1 < 2 < 3:
(i) Complete network is optimal if

min f1; 3Cg > 34 (min f2; 2Cg) + 14c
min f1; 3Cg > 12 (min f3; Cg) + 12c
.
(ii) 3-buyer network is optimal if

min f2; 2Cg > 43 (min f1; 3Cg)  13c
min f2; 2Cg > 23 (min f3; Cg) + 13c
.
(iii) 2-buyer network is optimal if

min f3; Cg > 2 (min f1; 3Cg)  c
min f3; Cg > 32 (min f2; 2Cg)  12c
.
From (i)-(iii) we see that higher heterogeneity in  supports partial networks, whereas if con-
sumers are su¢ ciently homogeneous in terms of ; the rm chooses a complete network. The
topologically important position of the centre is illustrated. The rm must guarantee his partici-
pation, thus its price may be constrained.
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8.2 Consumer surplus and total surplus under perfect information
Table 2: Consumer surplus, 1  2  3  4
Complete
network
3-buyer
network
2-buyer
network
Complete graph
q1 q2
q3q4
3 (2 + 3 + 4)  91 2 (3 + 4)  42 4   3
Circle A
q1 q2
q3q4
2 (2 + 3 + 4)  61 (23 + 4)  22 4   3
Circle B
q1 q3
q2q4
2 (2 + 3 + 4)  61
max f(3 + 4)  42;
(22 + 4)  23g
Dominated
Star, 2 as centre
q1
q2
q3
q4
(32 + 3 + 4)  31
max f(3 + 4)  42;
(22 + 4)  23g
Dominated
Star, 3 as centre
q1
q3
q2
q4
(2 + 33 + 4)  31 (23 + 4)  22 4   3
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Table 3: Total surplus, 1  2  3  4
Complete
network
3-buyer
network
2-buyer
network
Complete graph
q1 q2
q3q4
3 (1 + 2 + 3 + 4) 2 (2 + 3 + 4) 3 + 4
Circle A
q1 q2
q3q4
2 (1 + 2 + 3 + 4) 2 + 23 + 4 3 + 4
Circle B
q1 q3
q2q4
2 (1 + 2 + 3 + 4) 22 + 3 + 4 Dominated
Star, 2 as centre
q1
q2
q3
q4
1 + 32 + 3 + 4 22 + 3 + 4 Dominated
Star, 3 as centre
q1
q3
q2
q4
1 + 2 + 33 + 4 2 + 23 + 4 3 + 4
8.3 Stability of equilibria under asymmetric information
We provide checks for equilibria stability along the line of a Nash tâtonnement process (see e.g.
Fudenberg & Tirole 1991). This process checks equilibrium stability against small perturbations.
51
8.3.1 Symmetric networks
The equilibrium condition can be deconstructed into two equations  = zi (the 45-degree line) and
zi = 1   F

min
n
+;eio ; which must be equal in the equilibrium for all i 2 G. The condition
for asymptotic stability is
 @@zi  @zi@  < 1 8i 2 G: The deconstructed equilibrium condition is8>><>>:
 = z
z = 1  F   pn  for positive equilibria8>><>>:
 = z
z = 0
for the empty network.
We have for the maximal BNE
@
@z
  @z
@

=+
= 12 ; and the equilibrium is stable. For the lower
positive BNE the same check returns
@
@z
  @z
@

= 
= 2; which indicates that the equilibrium is
unstable. The empty network is also stable since
@
@z
  @z
@

=0
= 0:
8.3.2 Star
In the region where a non-zero positive equilibrium can exist, the equilibrium conditions are
C = 1  F

p
(I 1)

 = 1  F

p
C

We study only the case c = 0, + = 1; and   = 0; which we discuss in the main text. Since
the model does not give out explicit equilibrium values that would be easily applied to the stability
check
 @@C  @C@  < 1, we resort to a numerical test. When the equilibrium values C ,  and
p (C ; 
) are substituted in the stability equation, we can plot the curve s =
 @@C  @C@  for
di¤erent values of I: It turns out that s remains below one for I  3; and it approaches zero as
I grows very large. Hence, the equilibrium is a stable one. The other equilibrium, namely the
empty network, is obviously a stable one as well.
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